In this paper we will reconsider the dichotomy of "perspective" that conventionally informs most methodological discussions. This dichotomy separates the perspective of the actor from the perspective of the social scientist and is a crucial premiss of positivistic social science. It is not the separation of actor and scientist that is problematic; if the activities of the scientist are not negligible, a distinction will be made in any case. It is the supposition of a privileged perspective of the scientist that is problematic, as it is an implicit ontological distinction. Let us consider these perspectives.
As Holzner puts it, from the perspective of the actor, "society consists of the images which its members have of it [...] All of [the] images of social life, known norms, and legitimizing values, relate to the orientations of people who observe social life in the context in which they themselves act."/l/ This perspective, or orientation, as a moment of the knowing situation is included within the moment of subjectivity in the human situation. Collectively, these orientations make up the self-conceptions of historic societies. In this paper we shall discuss one illustrative case of the self-conception of an historic society, the United States since the Great Depression. The stratum of this historic society whose conception is of particular interest to us is that of the entrepreneurial groups or those who contribute the greater portion of personal savings in the United States. The substantive point we make about this stratum is perhaps of some interest in itself.
For the positivistic social scientist, by contrast, the social scientist has a privileged perspective, that of the true or transcendental self. Friedman, for instance, notes that an hypothesis includes "a conceptual world or abstract model simpler than the 'real world'" as well as "a set of rules defining the class of phenomena for which the 'model' can be taken to be an adequate representation of the 'real world'."/2/ Since this hypothesis addresses "any change in circumstances" either the social scientist is excluded from "the class of phenomena" of the hypothesis, as is usually the case in the resolution of the "identification problem," or else there needs to be a "fundamental distinction" between the physical and social sciences. Friedman disclaims the latter and suggests the former alternative./3/ He acknowledges of the hypothesis that "there inevitably will remain room for judgment in applying the rules."/4/ But our interest is not in the issue of the discretionary behavior of social scientists and its normative regulation, which can be taken as the elimination of any illicit content from the transcendental self. Instead, we will focus on the "conceptual world" of the observer as the social scientist's perspective, the socio-economic models of historic societies. No less than the actor's perspective then, do we locate the social scientist's perspective in the moment of subjectivity./5/ It is not to be supposed that the subjective moment is immediate in any case. There are linkages of these subjects. Those links are communicative links on the one hand, where perspectives are shared in both factual and valuative aspects. Opinions and attitudes as content of subjectivity are objectivized in various media between subjects. To recognize mediations of subjectivity is to recognize another and distinct moment of the human situation, the symbolic or cultural moment. But the content of subjectivity implicates its opposite, as opinions and attitudes are of another, the object, the prius of any objectivization.
Thus the links of these subjects are objective links on the other hand. A subject communicating with its alter is a dyad, whatever the consciousness of either, whatever the content or medium of communication. This is what Holzner has called the "situational" moment of society./6/ This completes the categorematics of the human situation. Whether we discuss humans restricted in time and space, the small interpersonal group, or unrestricted, historic societies, we find these moments. In the small, there is the self and alter as subjects, their structural relationship, their communicative media and its content, the common opinions and attitudes of community. The medium can be an intratemporal mode of communication such as the oral mode. In the large, there are the subjects with their structural relationships, situated both in time and space, and their media and its content. Here the medium may be an intertemporal mode such as the literate mode, but need not be. An intrapersonal mode, memory, in conjunction with an interpersonal mode such as the oral, may suffice.
These are the historically determined dimensions of the categories. Not only is the social scientist a subject, but he is objectively situated and communicates through various media, in various languages. It will not do, then, to accept uncritically the social scientist's proclaimed perspective and engage him in discussions about or even refinements of hypotheses and assumptions. Instead of the knowing situation, we begin with the human situation and ask: "Situate yourself".
After we provide our illustration, we shall amplify this discussion somewhat to address problems which attend increasing distance between the observer's and the actor's societies. That type of problem is minimized for synchronic cases where the scientist observes his own historic society Let us take a case in point. Institutionally, the household intersects two generic markets; consumption expenditures measure the intersection with the commodity market and income measures the intersection with the labor market. Household budget decisions, dramatizing the family's perspective as collective actor, are summarized by the functional relationship of expenditures and income in the so-called theory of the consumption function. That this actor's decisions realize its (collective) perspective was explicitly acknowledged by Keynes, who spoke of the particularities of the consumption function as "a fundamental psychological rule of any modern community."/7/ However, the particularities of this function or rule are problematic. In the short-run, the portion or ratio of aggregate income which is consumed is appreciably less than is the portion or ratio in the long-run. Notice that the theory of the consumption function is restricted in scope to the modern household, presupposing a mature and national commodity market of consumer goods, with its retailing institutions, as well as presupposing a mature and national money market with its banking institutions. This conjuncture was unrealized in the United States before the turn of this century.
Let us return to Friedman. In attempting to explain this discrepancy, he proposes that measured income and consumption expenditures are surface phenomena, reflecting permanent income and consumption which are invariant1y related both in the short-and long-run./8/ He acknowledges that the residuals between the household's reported and permanent variates, called the "transitory components" of income (or, of a lesser magnitude, of consumption), are perspectivally conditioned. At issue is what the household as collective actor "regards" or "views" as "other" than "expected."/9/ Again, the family holds "horizons of about three years" duration./10/ For the invariant ratio to hold requires, inter alia, that the sensitivity of aggregate consumption to changes in reported income (the income elasticity coefficient) declines as the variation of reported income increases. Let us briefly summarize the findings. Those occupational groups with the greatest variation of reported income are the entrepreneurial groups, the self-employed, as contrasted to wage earners. Two groups of self-employed are farmers and independent (small) businessmen. Their income elasticity of consumption is appreciably less (always under .7) than it is for wage earners' households (always over .7)./11/ Thus households with relatively steady incomes tend to adjust their consumption expenditure levels to current income levels. But that statement borders on the tautological. Households with variable reported income from diverse sources maintain relatively constant consumption expenditure levels, less dependent upon that reported income; indeed it is the analysis of these entrepreneurial groups which substantiates the permanent income hypothesis.
But there is a perspectival moment that cannot be ignored. Precisely those entrepreneurial groups whose consumption expenditure is relatively constant when compared to their reported income are the occupational groups which must maintain a relatively constant consumption level or lifestyle. These are the income-tax evading groups, as among others, Harry Kahn has told all of us as well as both Houses of the U.S. Congress./12/ No positivistic assumption about the role of "transitory components" as a source of income variation will bear on consumption expenditures determined independently of income, expenditure determined by prior consumption level and patterns, expenditure constrained with an eye on the Internal Revenue Service. That is an altogether perspectival moment, in Sutherland's terms, the frequency of definitions of the situation favorable and unfavorable towards the legal codes./13/ For the social scientist to recognize his own situation requires that he acknowledge the strategic interdependence of actor and investigator. The social scientist's supposition of a privileged perspective, his denial of the actor's subjectivity, is factually false. The privatization of the board room, like that of the nursery room, effectively removes the actor from scrutiny and expert opinion. Neither primitive accumulation nor primary socialization are socialized, as recent anxiety over the extent of child abuse indicates.
The tax evader will attempt to deceive the investigator with the same income report as was provided to the IRS. The investigator will then attempt to measure income independently of reported income, which necessitates an extrapolation from consumption expenditures, from life style. But this is the tactic of the IRS. Other than an "Operation Leprechaun", the alternative to the infinite regress of action and counteraction is the transcendence of this adversary relation towards community.
There is a second perspectival moment that is mandated to our consideration. A fundamental condition for the exercise of labor for the wage earner is the physical and social separation of household from the point of production. We emphasize social here because we notice two characteristics of Friedman's data which appear to be artifacts that contradict this fundamental condition. Recall that the reported income and consumption expenditures of the entrepreneurial groups are crucial to the theory of permanent income. But the reported income of farm households includes imputed, non-money items unavailable to wage earners' households: food grown for family use, for instance. Friedman estimates these imputed items account for about a third of total reported income./14/ Likewise the reported income of independent (small) businessmen's families is defined as "withdrawals from business."/15/ If the households whose income and consumption expenditures are at issue are assumed to be invariant, then the characteristics just noted appear to be artifacts because Friedman alludes to alternative definitions of the variates, especially of farm family income.
But these characteristics are not just artifactual, i.e. confined to the category of the symbolic. Instead, they reflect differences in the conditions for the exercise of labor. Rather than a physical and social separation of household and point of production, the farm is the coincidence of the two. This is especially emphasized in the label "family farm." Rather than the social separation of household and point of production reflected in two clearly differentiated systems of accounts, the independent (small) business frequently confounds the two, as "withdrawals from business" for household income attests. Indeed, bad accounting practices are one important contributing factor in the tremendous rate of small business failures.
For our purpose, we notice that the physical and institutional separation of household and point of production is of vital moment for the phenomenology of labor of the wage earner. When at the point of production, the wage earner has crossed the intersection of household and labor market into the latter. He is now a producer in exchange for income and has a suitable perspective. Likewise, when in the household (which in the modern world is nothing but a consumption unit: indeed Friedman treats the terms as synonyms), the wage earner has crossed back from the labor market. Now he is at the intersection of household and commodity market, is now a consumer in exchange for part of the household budget, and again has a suitable perspective. The perspectives of wage laborer and consumer are clearly differentiated.
By contrast, the physical and social coincidence of household and point of production is of no less vital moment for the phenomenology of the farmer or small business man. It is possible to turn from producer in exchange for income to consumer of one's own product, and back, at will. A farmer, picking apples in his orchard, stops to devour a juicy Winesap. A small grocer, stocking his shelves, stops to devour a bag of potato chips. It is this vacillation at the phenomenological level that reflects the coincidence of consumption unit and point of production. Only the apprehension of the particularity of perspective permits the identification of the actor as "consumer" or "producer." Given the significance of these entrepreneurial groups, a comprehension of the perspectival moment is necessary for a "theory of the consumption function," especially one based on the notion of "permanent income." Such comprehension entails a reconsideration of the role of various objectivizations; particularly, we refer to attitude polling techniques in social scientific endeavors./16/ The nature of the transcendence to community, or what Erich von Kahler has called the "collective," far transcends the scope of this paper./17/ Even if the conditions for community were stipulated, one could object that the discussion so far has been restricted to the comparative study of one historic society. We have simply compared one perspective on that society with another, and found that only in the join of the subjective and objective moments is the actuality of that society. What of historically distal societies?
Because it is temporally distal, the comparative study of such an historic society has two characteristics not encountered in our synchronic comparisons. First, because it is temporally distal or diachronic for us, neither the objectivity nor the subjectivity of this historic society is available to our recognition. The two are instead inferred through their various objectivizations in the historical and other artifactual records. This is an epistemic, not an ontological consideration; we should not suppose the social structure or consciousness of historic societies are mythical.
Second, because the specific join of objectivity and subjectivity is inferred, the particularities of social structure and consciousness are problematic. That neither is more problematic is categorically assured. We can charitably excuse Weber's supposition that "the feelings of primitive men" were a privileged domain by reference to his distress at the British Imperial employ of Gurkhas and other non-Aryans in battle./18/ It is not the humanity of the consciousness of the diachronic other but the coming into being, the process of becoming of the join of objectivity and subjectivity which is problematic.
Thus we shall distinguish temporally distal societies for the social process in itself and for another; epistemically, the former is the perspective on the process from within, the latter is the perspective from without, its exteriority. These perspectives are not abstractly juxtaposed. The distinction can be taken as a specific join of subjectivity and objectivity, where the collective or individual actor's subjectivity has a particular relationship to the collective or individual observer's subjectivity in that the join of the latter's objectivity and subjectivity is immanent in that of the former. This immanence could be denied only where the comparative perspective was one of mutual exteriority, where a pair of thoughtless processes are compared by an observer in a third. Again, this is the positive perspective of the transcendental self; the third is the indifferent other of the pair of processes in themselves. This is the failure of "situating oneself", the failure of recognition, thus the assumption of temporally distal societies as "natural," the other of Geist. But that particular assumption amounts to the rejection of comparative study.
Notice that there needs be no identity of the process for the other and the process in itself. The actor may not apprehend the becoming of its society, but the observer may not fully apprehend the becoming of the actor's society either. Such was the missionaries' judgment on "primitive promiscuity," or variants of cultural relativism. The objectivized consciousness or structure as the object of the scientists' perspective is the precondition of history. Being for another, the mutual situation of observer and temporally distal actor is the precondition that this history is not mere natural history.
Finally, the identity of the process both in itself and for another is actualized in the fully selfconscious process, the social process in and for itself. If this transcending of the unsocialized is not actualized for the temporally distal society, it is likewise not actualized for us, as we illustrated above. The absence of self-consciousness of the positive perspective is itself evidence.
Notes

